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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

UPTON COUNTY, TEXAS, PETITIONER

vs.

MARY TURNER, a/k/a MARY TURNER HIND,
A Feme Sole

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether alleged criminal acts of an elected sheriff constitute an official policy of a county to render the county liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
- 2.. Whether criminal acts of an alleged co-conspirator of the sheriff constitute an official policy of a county to render the county liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

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vs.

MARY TURNER, a/k/a MARY TURNER HIND,
A Feme Sole, Plaintiff

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Upton County, Texas, through its counsel, James P. Allison, petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to review the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this case. All of the parties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit are listed in the caption.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App. B, infra, B1-B2) is reported at 915

F.2d 133. The opinion of the District Court (App. A, infra, A1-A23) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on September 11, 1990. A petition for rehearing was denied on October 11, 1990. (App. C, infra, C1-C3). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code states:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."

STATEMENT

Mary Turner brought suit against Upton County, Texas and other defendants for the alleged actions of the County Sheriff and District Attorney. Turner alleged that the Sheriff and District Attorney had conspired to subject her to a "sham" trial on a trumped-up charge. On motion of the County, the District Court granted Summary Judgment absolving the County of all liability. The District Court held that Turner had failed to plead specific facts to demonstrate that her alleged injuries had been caused by an official county policy or custom. The District Court concluded that liability for the

alleged acts of the Sheriff and District Attorney could not be vicariously imposed upon the County. The District Court certified its judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) and Turner appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals held that the County Sheriff is the final policymaker for the County in the area of law enforcement and that an abuse of his authority would subject the county to liability. Further, the Court of Appeals held that if the Sheriff participated in a conspiracy to deprive Turner of her constitutional rights, the County would be vicariously liable for the acts of his alleged co-conspirator, the District Attorney. The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion with this statement: "When the official representing the ultimate repository of law enforcement power in

the county makes a deliberate decision to abuse that power to the detriment of its citizens, county liability under Section 1983 must attach, provided that the other prerequisites for finding liability under that section are satisfied." (App. B, infra, B21). The Court of Appeals remanded for trial.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This case presents a critical question concerning the liability of local governments for the alleged acts of their officers. The Court of Appeals has held that vicarious liability will be imposed upon local governments for the deliberate criminal acts of their elected officials. Further, the Court of Appeals has extended this vicarious liability to include responsibility for the acts of ~~any~~ co-conspirator of the brigand officer. As a result, local governments

and their taxpayers will be subjected to judgments for money damages for acts which they never condoned and which clearly exceeded the bounds of delegated authority.

This unprecedented ruling seriously misconstrues this Court's decisions in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) and Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The conclusion that a county is vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its officers contravenes the reasoning of every decision in this area and the extension of that vicarious liability to acts of co-conspirators surpasses the limits of even the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1. In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, supra, the Court held that local governments can be

sued under Section 1983 where "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy, statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." 436 U.S. at 690. However, the Court concluded that "a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691. The Court concluded "that a local government may not be sued under Section 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts

the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under Section 1983." Id. at 694. The Court expressly left further development of this definition of "policy" to later cases. Id. at 695.

In his concurring opinion in Monell, Justice Powell noted that "there are substantial line-drawing problems in determining 'when execution of a government's policy or custom' can be said to inflict constitutional injury such that 'government as an entity is responsible under Section 1983.'" Id. at 713. Indeed, this Court has rendered a succession of decisions since Monell in a continuing effort to define the proper extent of local government liability. The decision of the Court of Appeals below demonstrates the continuing ambiguity and debate in this area.

This case offers an opportunity to clarify an important element in the application of this Court's ruling in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, supra and subsequent decisions. The Court of Appeals has held that any illegal act committed by a final policy maker will be sufficient to impose municipal liability. (App. B, infra, B17). The decision below specifically admits that these alleged acts were not authorized by the county and would directly contravene the statutory duties of the sheriff. (App. B, infra, B14-B15). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that such acts constitute policies of the county. This holding deviates from the reasoning and analysis adopted by this Court in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, supra. This Court in Pembaur held that "municipal liability under

Section 1983 attaches where - and only where - a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." Id. at 483. Where the alleged acts of these officers are clearly proscribed by state law and not authorized by the local government, they are not within the alternatives delegated to the policymaker.

The issue of the limits on the authority of individual policymakers to subject the local government to liability was directly addressed by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, supra. Selecting an illustration that precisely parallels the facts in this case, Justice White stated as follows: "Local law enforcement

officers are expected to obey the law and ordinarily swear to do so when they take office. Where the controlling law places limits on their authority, they cannot be said to have the authority to make contrary policy." Id. at 486. "If deliberate or mistaken acts..., admittedly contrary to local law, expose the county to liability, it must be on the basis of respondeat superior and not because the officers' acts represent local policy. Such results would not conform to Monell and the cases following it." Id. Turner has accused the Sheriff and the District Attorney of choosing a course of action forbidden by applicable law. These alleged actions cannot constitute policies of the County.

While the Sheriff in Upton County, Texas is clothed with broad discretionary powers necessary to law enforcement, the

County is not liable for his alleged acts contrary to state law and established policy. When government officials act totally outside the law, or in a manner clearly proscribed by law, they are not applying county policy and incur individual liability only. There is no basis upon which liability could attach to the County for these acts under the decisions of this Court cited herein.

2. The Court of Appeals further improperly imposed liability on the County by holding that the County would be vicariously responsible for any acts of alleged co-conspirators of the sheriff. The Court of Appeals relied upon accepted authority concerning vicarious liability of co-conspirators for the acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy. (App. B, infra, B19-B21). The decisions cited by the Court of

Appeals would certainly provide authority to impose individual liability upon the Sheriff for those alleged acts. However, at the risk of repetition, liability can only be imposed upon the county for its policies. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, supra. The Sheriff cannot establish a county policy to engage in criminal conspiracies. To establish such a doctrine would subject the County to a standard of liability far exceeding respondeat superior.

In summary, the decision of the Court of Appeals greatly expands the vicarious liability of local governments to include all deliberate illegal acts of their elected officers and other policy makers. Local governments have no means to prevent or deter these unauthorized acts by elected officials. The Court of

Appeals has grossly misapplied the decisions of this Court by reversing the District Court's dismissal of the complaint and remanding for trial.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX A

**ORDER OF U.S. DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS, MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION

MARY TURNER §
V. § MO-88-CA-311
§
UPTON COUNTY, §
TEXAS, ET AL. §

ORDER

BEFORE THIS COURT are the Motions of Upton County, Texas and J.W. Johnson, Defendants herein, for Summary Judgment in the above-numbered cause. Plaintiff timely filed responses to both Motions. Having considered the Motions, responses, and the relevant statutory and common law authority, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion of Upton County should be granted and the Motion of J.W. Johnson should be granted in part and denied in part.

STANDARD ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The non-moving party may not rest on a mere denial of arguments set out in the motion, but must come forth with specific facts which show that a material fact issue exists. F.R.C.P. 56(e). "Specific facts" constitute "more than simply...that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 477 U.S.

574, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 106 S.Ct. 1348
(1986).

Thus, in ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court must determine whether material facts are in dispute - facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-8, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 108 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed.2d 107 (1987). Under Anderson, this Court must consider the substantive burden of proof imposed on the party making the claim; the burden of proof then shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence in support of its claims. Anderson, supra; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548
(1986).

This Court has shown its willingness to allow a Plaintiff her day in Court when the case presents questions of fact properly tried by the fact finder. In the case sub judice, however, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that material facts regarding her claims against Upton County exist which warrant submission of the case to a jury. In the case of the Plaintiff's claims against J.W. Johnson, however, the Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff has plead facts which, if taken as true, warrant submission to the fact finder of only those claims against Defendant Johnson in his individual capacity.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Upton County moves this Court to grant a summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the Texas Statute of Limitations precludes Plaintiff's claims against Upton County; (2) respondeat superior is not a valid claim against a governmental entity under 42 U.S.C. §1983; (3) Plaintiff has made no claim of that the injuries plead were the result of a policy or custom of Upton County; and (4) a county is not liable for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Each shall be discussed seriatim.

Plaintiff bases her claim on the alleged "sham" trial against Plaintiff which occurred in March of 1987. This Court, by Order dated July 15, 1989, found that the Texas two-year Statute of

Limitations applied to the facts of this case, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Owens v. Okure, ____ U.S. ____, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). See: Turner v. Upton County, MO-88-CA-311, slip op. at 3, 4 (July 15, 1989). Plaintiff originally filed her Complaint against Upton County on December 8, 1988. Accordingly, all "actions" taken by the Upton County from December 8, 1986 until the present shall come under the Court's scrutiny. As far as any liability of Upton County is premised upon actions of Defendant J.W. Johnson, the District Attorney of Upton County at all times relevant to this suit, Defendant Johnson was brought into the suit by Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint filed March 30, 1989. As discussed by this Court in its

Order of July 15, 1989, the Plaintiff filed her Motion to Amend, which was subsequently granted, on March 16, 1989 and the Court shall consider March 16, 1989 as the operative filing date of the Second Amended Complaint. Thus, all actions taken by Mr. Johnson from March 16, 1987 until the present shall be admissible against Defendants Johnson and Upton County. Thus, the Texas Statute of Limitations does not preclude the Plaintiff from maintaining a cause of action against Defendant Upton County.

As for Plaintiff's claims against Upton County based upon a theory of respondeat superior, the Supreme Court has ruled that 42 U.S.C. §1983 does not support such a theory. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Plaintiff, by her response to Upton County's Motion, informs the Court that she intends to plead respondeat superior as a pendant state law theory of recovery. Plaintiff did not plead respondeat superior as a pendant state law claim in her Third Amended Complaint and this Court shall not allow her to bring a new cause of action against Upton County on the eve of trial within a response to a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff did, however, properly plead that the actions of Defendants Willeford and Johnson were the result of a policy or custom of Upton County. Specifically, Plaintiff's Response suggests that liability may attach against Upton County for its policy that the Sheriff and

District Attorney of Upton County has unlimited power to create, prosecute and try drug cases in Upton County. Plaintiff also suggests that a discretionary fund set up by the County for "information" which was available to Sheriff Willeford upon request, constitutes "policy" of Upton County.

First, it is important to note that eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to counties. Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, a county may be liable under §1983 if the Plaintiff can show that the alleged wrongdoing was the result of a policy or custom of the county. Monell, supra. Unconstitutional policy may be inferred from a single decision taken by the highest officials responsible for setting policy in that

area of the government's business. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 63 L.Ed.2d 673, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980). The Supreme Court, in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 89 L.Ed.2d 452, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986), set out some guiding principles as to when a single decision may render a municipality liable for the acts of its policy makers. First, municipalities may be held liable only for acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered. Second, only those municipal officials with final policymaking authority may by their actions subject the government to §1983 liability. Third, whether a particular official has "final policymaking authority" is a question of state law. Fourth, the challenged action must have

been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the municipality's business.¹

In the case of Saint Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), the Supreme Court sought to give further guidance to situations such as the case sub judice wherein a governing body has given certain officials discretionary authority in certain circumstances. The Praprotnik opinion held that

the authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy. [Cites omitted.] When an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official's making, those policies, rather than the subordinate's

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¹ In Pembaur, the City of Cincinnati was held accountable for the county prosecutor's decision that deputy sheriffs should forcibly enter the petitioner's clinic to serve capias.

departures from them, are the act of the municipality. Similarly, when a subordinate's decision is subject to review by the municipality's authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official's conduct for conformance with their policies. If the authorized policymakers approve, a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final. (Emphasis in original.)

99 L.Ed.2d at 120.

The Fifth Circuit has made the additional distinction that an official's abuse of discretionary authority is not a "policy" of the municipality so long as the authority itself is not offensive to the Fourth Amendment. Spann for Spann v. Tyler Independent School District, 876 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1989) (Brown, J. dissenting). In other words, the Plaintiff at bar does not claim that Upton County authorized Sheriff Willeford to

abuse the "information" fund, instead the County authorized Willeford to call upon the fund at his discretion. Similarly, Plaintiff does not claim that Upton County authorized the District Attorney to pursue frivolous criminal actions, but instead allowed J.W. Johnson to instigate those suits which he chose to maintain. But note that "sufficiently numerous incidents of . . . misconduct . . . may tend to prove a custom by the municipality's policymakers." McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1989). Outside of Plaintiff's allegations with regard to this particular lawsuit and Sheriff Willeford's use of "information" funds on the occasion in question, Plaintiff has not plead other incidents

of abuse by Defendants Willeford or Johnson.

In light of the foregoing, this Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has not plead specific facts sufficient to show that a policy or custom of Upton County caused the alleged injuries to the Plaintiff. To subject Upton County to liability for the alleged abuse of discretion by Sheriff Willeford and J.W. Johnson, if those allegations are taken as true, would be to hold Upton County to a respondeat superior theory of recovery, an outcome clearly precluded by Monell, supra. Having so found, the Court finds it unnecessary to address Upton County's fourth and final argument: liability for punitive damages.

As for Defendant Johnson's Motion for

Summary Judgment, the Court is loathe to digress from the Supreme Court's ruling in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 47 L.Ed.2d 128, 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976) allowing absolute immunity against §1983 liability to prosecutors who are acting within their prosecutorial role. In Imbler, the Supreme Court noted that

[t]he prosecutor's possible knowledge of a witness' falsehoods, the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense, the propriety of a closing argument, and - ultimately in every case - the likelihood that prosecutorial misconduct so infected a trial as to deny due process, are typical of issues with which judges struggle in actions for post-trial relief, sometimes to differing conclusions. The presentation of such issues in a §1983 action often would require a virtual retrial of the criminal offense in a new forum, and the resolution of some technical issues by the lay jury.

47 L.Ed.2d at 140.² Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Johnson stem wholly from the prosecution of the alleged "sham" criminal trial, including the ferreting of incriminating evidence and the presentation of known perjured testimony. The Court in Imbler addressed those types of actions when it stated:

Attaining the system's goals of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence. The veracity of witnesses in criminal cases frequently is subject to doubt before and after they testify, as is illustrated by

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² The facts of Imbler reveal that the Plaintiff's habeas corpus motion had previously been granted upon a finding of the Federal District Court that the prosecuting attorney knowingly used false testimony and suppressed evidence favorable to the defense in the state criminal action. Despite the plaintiff's formidable case against the prosecuting attorney under §1983, the Supreme Court declined to allow recovery against the attorney on the grounds of prosecutorial immunity.

the history of this case. If prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about result in personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence.

47 L.Ed.2d at 141. See also: Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1989); Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1989) (assistant district attorney entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity even assuming allegation that bill of information on which plaintiff was convicted was defective); Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550 (5th Cir. 1988) (county prosecutor shielded by absolute immunity because alleged improper setting of case falls within course and scope of prosecution); Mills v. Criminal District Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1988) (allegation

that court-appointed attorney conspired with the prosecution and the judge to deny plaintiff his constitutional rights to adequate legal representation and a fair trial did not overcome the immunity of the judge or the prosecuting attorney); Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1985) (presentation to a grand jury in a manner calculated to obtain an indictment, even when maliciously, wantonly or negligently accomplished, is immunized).

Finally, the Imbler Court noted that although §1983 does not afford a wronged Plaintiff relief from egregious conduct on the part of the unethical prosecutor, various avenues have been created to render aid in such a situation. For example, 18 U.S.C. §242 is available to

punish judges and prosecutors alike for willful deprivations of constitutional rights. The Courts noted further that

a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of a crime.

47 L.Ed.2d at 143.³

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³ The Plaintiff seeks to rely on Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1985) in pinning Defendant Johnson with §1983 liability. The facts in Crane do not deal with the prosecutorial role of the district attorney, however. Instead, Crane is an illustration of an administrative function (instigation of system by district attorney whereby a writ of habeas corpus could issue without a finding of probable cause) which the Imbler Court expressly found not immune from §1983 liability.

Aside from the Plaintiff's claims regarding perjury and secreting of exculpatory evidence, Plaintiff includes a claim that Defendant Johnson sent an investigator to the premises of Plaintiff's store without benefit of a Miranda warning to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not, however, state the date of such incident. As stated above, Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint alleges wrongdoing in connection with the March 24, 1987 criminal trial of the Plaintiff. Further, any event which occurred prior to March 16, 1987 is barred by the Texas two-year Statute of Limitations. Thus, the Plaintiff has failed to plead a specific fact in order to stave off summary judgment as to the particular incident in question.

Finally, the Court notes that much of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint brings forth allegations of a conspiracy between the Defendants Johnson and Willeford. Conspiracy, being outside of the scope of both prosecutorial conduct and the law is not immunized. It is the Court's opinion that the Plaintiff's allegations of a conspiracy between Defendants Johnson and Willeford state a claim upon which Plaintiff may recover against Johnson in his individual capacity. See, e.g.: Madison v. Purdy, 410 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1969); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).

In light of the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Upton County's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant J.W. Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant Johnson is granted a summary judgment insofar as the Plaintiff's claims involve Johnson in his official capacity. Defendant Johnson is denied summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claims against him in his individual capacity.

SIGNED AND ENTERED this 9th day of October, 1989.

/s/ Lucius D. Bunton
LUCIUS D. BUNTON
CHIEF JUSTICE

APPENDIX B

**OPINION OF THE U.S. COURT
OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT**

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 89-8034

MARY TURNER, a/k/a MARY
TURNER HIND, A Feme Sole,

Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

UPTON COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendant-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
(MO-88-CA-311)

(September 11, 1990).

Before RUBIN, POLITZ, and BARKSDALE,
Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:*

Contending that Upton County, Texas should be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the alleged conspiracy of the county sheriff and district attorney to subject her to a "sham" trial, Mary Turner appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the county. Concluding that the alleged actions, if

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* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

proven, properly would be regarded as actions of the county, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Background

Turner's lawsuit is based upon events surrounding her March 1987 trial in Texas state court on felony drug charges. Turner alleges that in August 1985 then-Upton County Sheriff Glenn Willeford paid Larry Woolf, an informant, to plant methamphetamine on her business premises and then, acting under color of law, the Sheriff seized the drugs pursuant to a search warrant, leading to her indictment for possession of a controlled substance.¹

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¹ Turner Alleges that Sheriff Willeford's actions were motivated by revenge or a desire to "keep her quite" because she was aware of improprieties allegedly committed by him.

Turner further alleges that Sheriff Willeford then conspired with J.W. Johnson, Jr., District Attorney for the 112th Judicial District, which includes Upton County, to force her to stand trial on what they knew to be a trumped-up charge, to secure perjured testimony by one Larry Dale Jackson in an attempt to discredit one of her witnesses, and to convince her to plead guilty to an offense of which they knew she was innocent.

On December 8, 1988 Turner filed suit against the county, Woolf, and the sheriff, both in his official and individual capacities. On March 16, 1989 Turner added District Attorney Johnson as a defendant in both his official and individual capacities.

In July 1989 the district court ruled that the Texas two-year statute of limitations applied to Turner's allegations, citing **Owens v. Okure**, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). Under this earlier ruling, which is now the law of the case, both the county and the sheriff may be held liable for their actions from December 8, 1986 to the present, and both the county and the district attorney may be held liable for their actions from March 16, 1987 to the present. The events surrounding the alleged "planting" of the methamphetamine, Turner's arrest, and her indictment, are no longer available as a cause of action.

Following the district attorney's successful motion for a more definite

statement, Turner filed a third amended complaint. The district court granted summary judgment absolving the county of all liability and Johnson of liability in his official capacity. With regard to the county, the district court found that Turner had failed to plead specific facts sufficient to show that her alleged injuries had been caused by an official county policy or custom. The court concluded that to subject the county to liability for the acts of the sheriff and district attorney would amount to respondeat superior, an outcome precluded by **Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services**, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The court further held that the district attorney

was entitled to absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for actions taken within the scope of his prosecutorial role, **Imbler v. Pachtman**, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), but that Turner's allegations of a conspiracy between him and the sheriff stated a claim upon which Turner could recover against the district attorney in his individual capacity. Despite the continued viability in whole or in part of her claims against the individual defendants, Turner expressed her desire to appeal the dismissal of Upton County, stipulating that she would dismiss the remaining claims if the district court's ruling were affirmed. The court certified its judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) and Turner timely appealed.

Analysis

Remaining in the wake of the district court's prior limitation ruling and its current ruling on appeal is Turner's claim that the sheriff, in his official and individual capacities, and the district attorney, in his individual capacity, conspired to subject her to trial on false charges bolstered by fabricated evidence and perjured testimony and, despite their knowledge of the true circumstances and of her innocence, attempted to coerce her to change her plea from not guilty to guilty. The county's liability, if any, must be based upon this claim.

In granting summary judgment for the county the district court apparently assumed that the sheriff's authority was

granted by the county's governing body, which the court concluded had given him "discretionary authority in certain circumstances." The court's analysis of county liability was premised upon the following language from the Supreme Court's opinion in **City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik**:

[T]he authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy. . . . When an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official's making, those policies, rather than the subordinate's departures from them, are the act of the municipality. Similarly, when a subordinate's decision is subject to review by the municipality's authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official's conduct for conformance with their policies. If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their

ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.

485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (citations omitted, emphasis in original). In premising the county's liability on whether its governing body had ratified the alleged actions of these officials, i.e., whether they had acted pursuant to an official county policy or custom, the district court inadvertently overlooked the possibility that the sheriff and district attorney were themselves the final policymakers with respect to the matters under their jurisdiction whose actions, to the citizens of Upton County, were the actions of the county itself.

Two configurations can lead to a municipality's liability under section

1983 for the acts of its officials. In the first, typified by the district court's reference to Praprotnik, a municipality's final policymakers are held effectively to have made policy or condoned creation of a custom by ratifying the unconstitutional or illegal actions of subordinate officers or employees. In the second, the municipality may be held liable for the illegal or unconstitutional actions of its final policymakers themselves as they engage in the setting of goals and the determination of how those goals will be achieved. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). We find the latter, not the former, to be applicable in the instant case.

It has long been recognized that, in Texas, the county sheriff is the county's final policymaker in the area of law enforcement, not by virtue of delegation by the county's governing body but, rather, by virtue of the office to which the sheriff has been elected:

Because of the unique structure of county government in Texas . . . elected county officials, such as the sheriff . . . hold[] virtually absolute sway over the particular tasks or areas of responsibility entrusted to him by state statute and is accountable to no one other than the voters for his conduct therein. . . . Thus, at least in those areas in which he, along, is the final authority or ultimate repository of county power, his official conduct and decisions must necessarily be considered those of one "whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy" for which the county may be held responsible under section 1983.

Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391,

404 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, citations omitted); see Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 796 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 3476, 87 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985). Among other responsibilities he is charged with preserving the peace in his jurisdiction and arresting all offenders. Tex. Code Crim. P. arts. 2.13, 2.17. As the county's final policymaker in this area, he has been empowered by the state to "define objectives and choose the means of achieving them" without county supervision. Rhode v. Denson, 776 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986). These means include the investigation of crimes, the

collection of evidence thereof, and the presentation of this evidence to the district attorney for purposes of determining the appropriateness of prosecution. In essence, Turner alleges that in her case the sheriff, in conspiracy with the district attorney, set an impermissible goal of subjecting her to trial on false charges and used the powers inherent in his position as chief county law enforcement officer to create the case presented at trial, secure perjured testimony, and attempt to coerce her to plead guilty.

If proven, therefore, the sheriff's participation as a coconspirator, constituting as it would an abuse of his

authority as the ultimate repository of law enforcement power in Upton County, would render the county liable as well.²

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² Cognizant of potential eleventh amendment complications, we have repeatedly confronted the issue of whether a county official in particular circumstance was acting as an official of the state or of the county. See Familias Unidas, 619 F.2d at 404 (county judge implementing unconstitutional state law acted as a state official); Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412 (5th Cir.), amended on reh'g, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 570, 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985) (district attorney enforcing unconstitutional county policy acted as a county official); Echols v. Parker, Nos. 89-4349, 89-4633 (5th Cir. August 13, 1990) (when official, state or local, is directed in his actions by state statute, he acts as a state official).

Turner's allegations are somewhat different in that her complaint does not concern the way in which the sheriff enforced a state or county law or policy enforced by another branch of one of those entities; rather, she alleges that he abused the powers inherent in his role as chief policymaker for how the peace should be kept in Upton County.

Holding the county liable for the actions of its sheriff under these circumstances does not run afoul of **Monell's** admonition against respondeat superior liability on the part of the county for the actions of its employees. The sheriff is an elected county official equal in authority to the county commissioners within that jurisdiction; his actions are as much the actions of the county as the actions of those commissioners.³ As the Supreme Court stated in **Pembaur**:

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³ The county contends that it cannot be subject to liability because it did not authorize the sheriff to violate the law. This argument is without merit. Where a final policymaker abuses the powers vested in his position to the detriment of a citizen, that abuse can be the basis for suit being brought under section 1983, assuming the other bases for satisfying the requirements of that section are properly alleged.

To hold a municipality liable for actions ordered by such officers exercising their policymaking authority is no more an application of the theory of respondeat superior than was holding the municipalities liable for the decisions of the City Councils in *Owen*⁴ and *Newport*.⁵ In each case municipal liability attached to a single decision to take unlawful action made by municipal policymakers.

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⁴ *Owen v. City of Independence*, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (city council passed resolution firing plaintiff without a pretermination hearing).

⁵ *Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.*, 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (city council canceled concert license after dispute over content of performance).

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483.

Just as the alleged actions of the sheriff were, under the circumstances, the actions of the county for section 1983 purposes, so too the alleged actions of the elected district attorney may have been, even though he covered more than his county. The sheriff's and the district attorney's alleged participation in the conspiracy, if proven, will suffice to impose liability on the county.

The contention that a conspiracy existed which deprived the petitioner of rights guaranteed by federal law makes each member of the conspiracy potentially liable for the effects of that deprivation. Liability arises from membership in the conspiracy and from traditional notions that a conspirator is vicariously liable for the acts of his co-conspirators. Liability does not arise solely because of the individual's own conduct. Some personal conduct may serve as

evidence of membership in the conspiracy, but the individual's actions do not always 'serve as the exclusive basis for liability.⁶

Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1263 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds, **Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co.**, 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir.) (en banc), aff'd, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1979). In stating that the county could be held liable not only for the sheriff's participation in the conspiracy, but could be held directly or vicariously liable as well for the actions of his alleged

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⁶ As a consequence, all parties to an alleged section 1983 conspiracy need not be state actors or charged in the same capacities for liability to attach to all -- even if one of the coconspirators is absolutely immune from liability for his own actions as a participant. See **Richardson v. Fleming**, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.) 1981).

coconspirator, we carefully distinguish this premise for vicarious liability from that prohibited by **Monell**, in which "the sole nexus between the employer and the tort is the fact of the employer-employee relationship." **Monell**, 436 U.S. at 693.

When the official representing the ultimate repository of law enforcement power in the county makes a deliberate decision to abuse that power to the detriment of its citizens, county liability under section 1983 must attach, provided that the other prerequisites for finding liability under that section are satisfied. The district court erred in

absolving the county of section 1983 liability.⁷

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith.

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⁷ Turner also complains that the district court erred in concluding that she had failed in her third amended complaint to allege viable state claims against the parties over which it could assert its pendent jurisdiction and urges that the court should have exercised its power to hear her state claims. Turner's state law allegations against the county are based solely upon "respondeat superior," which is not, in and of itself, a cause of action. Moreover, Turner does not assert that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction, only that it should have done so. We will not disturb the court's ruling. See Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1988).

APPENDIX C

**ORDER OF THE U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT DENYING
MOTION FOR REHEARING**

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 89-8034

MARY TURNER, a/k/a
MARY TURNER HIND, A Feme Sole,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UPTON COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the
United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion 9-11-90, 5 Cir., 198_____,
F.2d _____)

(OCTOBER 11, 1990)

Before Rubin, Politz, and Barksdale,
Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

(v) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc, (Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 35) the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Henry A. Politz
Henry A. Politz
United States Circuit Judge